18 July 2016

The Implications of Turkey's Failed Coup

The recent failed military coup in Turkey caught most observers by surprise, despite the fact that Turkey has experienced three military coups since 1960, as well as the fact that political tensions in Turkey are at their highest level in decades.  In fact, this coup attempt was just the latest in a series of developments that have dramatically destabilized Turkey in recent years.  These destabilizers include:

  • The ongoing conflicts in Turkey's neighbors, Syria and Iraq
  • The recent intensification of clashes against Kurdish militias
  • The temporary breaking off of relations between Turkey and Russia
  • President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's efforts to consolidate political power
  • The crackdown on supporters of the exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen
  • The economic slump that has hit Turkey in recent years.

For Turkey this failed coup is likely to have major domestic implications as it is highly likely that President Erdogan will use the coup as an excuse to launch a major crackdown on his opponents, while moving quickly to transfer more political powers to the presidency.  Moreover, the fallout from this coup will have major implications for Turkey’s neighbors, as well as its political and economic partners further abroad.

This coup attempt began with a number of high-profile actions by the elements of the Turkish military behind the coup, including the seizure of bridges and other important locations in Istanbul, as well as attacks on government and police offices in Ankara.  In the first hours of the coup attempt, it appeared that the plotters had successfully isolated President Erdogan, who was on holiday in southwestern Turkey. 

However, the coup quickly began to lose momentum when President Erdogan was able to travel to Istanbul and as most elements of Turkey’s armed forces refused to support the coup.  Moreover, large numbers of Turkish citizens took to the streets to express their opposition to the coup, leading to clashes between rebellious soldiers and the protestors.  In fact, after its initial successes, the coup quickly petered out and within hours, nearly all of the soldiers involved in the coup had been killed or arrested.  In the end, nearly 300 people died in the coup, while more than 6,000 people (including nearly 3,000 judges) were arrested in connection with the coup attempt. 

This failed coup attempt, coupled with the series of terrorist attacks that have taken place in Turkey in recent months, provide President Erdogan with an opportunity to further consolidate political power in Turkey in his hands and to purge his remaining rivals.  He had already sidelined most of the members of his Justice and Development Party (AKP) who were opposed to his efforts to transfer political powers to the presidency after he moved to that position in 2014.  Now, he is likely to remove officers of questionable loyalty from the armed forces and replace them with officers loyal to him personally, giving him far more power over Turkey’s armed forces than ever before. 

In the meantime, President Erdogan has blamed this coup on the exiled cleric Fethullah Gulen and, having already purged this cleric’s supporters from many centers of power in Turkey, he is likely to attempt to finish the job.  This is evidenced by the fact that nearly 3,000 judges have been arrested since the coup, as the judiciary in Turkey is seen as being filled with Gulenists who have stood in the way of the president’s efforts to change the constitution in order to enhance his power.  Altogether, this coup could pave the way for a dramatic weakening of Turkey’s democracy, something that could severely impact Turkey’s economy and damage its relations with many key international partners.

Much of the destabilization of Turkey that has occurred in the years leading up to this failed coup originated from outside of Turkey’s borders and the fallout from this coup is certain to have a major impact on Turkey’s neighbors and foreign partners.  For example, this coup and the likely reactions to it by the Turkish government are likely to damage relations with the United States and the European Union, the two powers that have urged democratic reforms in Turkey.  Instead, the Turkish government is likely to turn to less democratic partners for political and economic support should relations with the West falter. 

In fact, the recent rapprochement between Presidents Erdogan and Putin can be viewed in this context, as well as the recent decision by the Turkish government to try and find a common ground with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.  Meanwhile, the decline in stability in Turkey, coupled with the potential rollback of the country’s democratic reforms, could lead to a complete collapse in ties between Europe and Turkey, a dangerous situation given Turkey’s vital role in stemming the flow of migrants and militants between the Middle East and Europe.  As a result, President Erdogan may never have a better opportunity to strengthen his grip on power, as Turkey’s international partners may choose to ignore his power grab if it means more cooperation from Turkey with regards to the conflicts and the migration crisis in its region.