Populism in Europe
Europe entered 2017 filled with trepidation, with a fear that internal and external factors would result a dramatic end to the region’s efforts to push ahead with political and economic integration. This trepidation was the result of many developments in recent years that jeopardized Europe’s economic well-being and its security. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and backed a separatist rebellion in eastern Ukraine, bringing back the specter of a Russian threat in the east. In 2015, Europe was rocked by a migration crisis that resulted in more than one million migrants from unstable and poor areas to Europe’s south and east flowing seemingly unhindered across the region. In 2016, Britain voted to leave the European Union, while Donald Trump was elected as president of Europe’s giant Western partner, the United States. As such, it is easy to see why Europeans were so jittery as they approached what would be one of the more critical years in the region’s history.
As 2017 nears its end, it was clear that the multitude of important elections that took place across Europe had a major impact on the region. On one hand, right-wing and left-wing populists made gains in this year’s elections in many of Europe’s most important countries, while many mainstream political parties adopted some of the populist policies championed by those parties to their right and left. On the other hand, populist parties were prevented from entering the government in nearly all of the countries that held elections in Europe in 2017. This was due to the fact, with just a few exceptions, mainstream political parties refused to allow them into governing coalitions. Of course, this will do little to stem the rising support for these populist parties, as history has shown that they are much more successful in the opposition than in government. Therefore, while Europe breathes a sigh of relief that the potential populist wave was averted this year, the threat of far-right and far-left populism will remain very real for the foreseeable future.
Across Europe, the trends are clear. Support for populist political movements is on the rise across the region. Almost without exception, the total share of the vote for populist right-wing and left-wing political parties is on the rise, with a sharp increase in recent years in many of Europe’s most influential countries. This rising support for these populist parties is taking place despite the fact that more mainstream political parties have adopted some of the policies of their populist rivals. Moreover, while much of the focus has been on the rise in support for far-right political parties in Europe, the far-left has also seen a rebound in its support in recent years.
There are many examples of this increase in support for far-right and far-left political parties. In Germany, the combined share of the vote in national elections for far-right and far-left political parties was consistently below 10% until the early 2000s. However, the rise of far-left Linke (Left) party and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) resulted in populist parties winning nearly 25% of the vote in this year’s national elections in Germany, their highest-ever share of the vote in post-war Germany. In France, support for far-left and far-right populist parties and leaders has traditionally been higher than in most other European countries, but here too it has risen sharply in recent years. In fact, in the first round of voting in this year’s presidential election in France, candidates on the far-right and the far-left combined to win nearly 50% of the vote, a shockingly-high figure. These trends are being replicated across Europe, as new far-right parties and long-standing far-left parties enjoy a surge in support that has brought them closer than ever to power in those countries.
There are many reasons why voters across Europe are throwing their support behind the far-right and the far-left. One basic reason is the simple fact that the region’s population is aging rapidly. This is resulting in more older voters, many of whom opt to support far-right parties backing conservative policies, leaving a shrinking younger voting segment that feels economically and socially alienated by the impact of the policies enacted at the behest of older voters. Another issue that has dramatically boosted support for the far-right in Europe is migration, with 2015’s migration crisis hardening opposition to immigration across the region. Europe’s recent economic woes have also played a major role in boosting support for populists. Even as most European economies have staged a recovery in recent years, growth rates remain well below the levels enjoyed by previous generations, while wages are relatively stagnant and job creation levels remain insufficient. As in most developed regions, working class voters are flocking to populist parties and leaders, seeking someone to blame for the loss of working class jobs in their countries. Looking at these factors, it is clear that none of them will disappear overnight, and instead, are likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future.
Given the political, economic, demographic and social situation in Europe, it seems certain that populism will remain a potent force in European politics for years to come. Economically, Europe’s recovery is forecast to lose steam in the coming years, while a number of factors could lead to another crisis in the region, or some of its countries, in the coming years. This, coupled with trends such as automation and globalization, will result in a continuation of the low job creation levels that have stoked anger among Europe’s working class population. As such, many voters will back political leaders calling for more protectionist measures, or for more state control of the economy. On the political side, the threat of migration will remain as the situation around Europe’s periphery remains unsettled and this will continue to boost support for anti-immigration policies. Nationalism also remains a threat to Europe, as evidenced by the recent developments in Britain, Spain and elsewhere.
As these trends continue, mainstream political parties in Europe will be forced to adopt more-and-more populist policies in a bid to regain the support that they have lost to far-right and far-left parties in recent years. However, their advantage over the newer populist political movements is likely to be eroded in the coming years, threatening their once dominant positions in many countries.
As a result, there are two likely outcomes. One, the proliferation of new political parties on the right- and left-wings will lead to political gridlock, a situation that has already made the formation of coalition governments in many European countries an increasingly difficult and lengthy process. The other possibility is that populist parties actually gain power in one of more European countries. So far, their only brush with governing has been as junior members of coalitions with mainstream parties. However, this could soon change, and, for the first time in many decades, populists could run the governments of one or more major European countries.